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Has Programmed Trading Made
Stock Prices More Volalile?
G. .1. Santoni
Ifthere must be madness, something maybe saidfor having it on a heroic scale.
— John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash, p. 69.
NY people believe that stock prices have
become considerably more volatile in recent years.
Typical descriptions have characterized stock market
behavior as “careening through” trading ranges, sub-
ject to “wild gyrations,” and the product of “unex-
pected insanity.”
The presumed source of the volatility is a trading
strategy called “programmed trading.”2 This strategy,
which essentially involves trading on small and short-
lived price differences for the same group of stocks in
the spot, futures and options markets, is not new. The
introduction of stock jnde~futures around 1982 and
the application of computer techniques to monitor
price differences and triggertrades between markets,
however, are novel. These two innovations have re-
duced the cost of transacting among the markets,
which has resulted in increased trading activity. The
increased activity, the size of the trades made by
individual players and the behavior of stock prices on
days when stock index futures and options contracts
0.J~ Santoni is asenior economist at the FederalReserve Bank of St.
Louis. Thomas A. Pollmann provided research assistance.
‘See “Abreast of the Market” (1987) and Clark(1987). Otherexam-
ples can be found in the Wall Street Journal on the following dates:
January 16; January 20; January 23.
2See, for example, Stoll and Whaley (1987), Laderman and Frank
(September 29, 1986); Laderman, et. al (April 7, 1986); Stoller
(February 9,1987) and McMurray (February 12,1987).
mature (triple witching daysl haveled many observers
to conclude that this trading strategy has increased
stock price volatility?
The alleged increase in volatility has led both to
closer scrutiny by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and to calls forlegislative action.4 In response
to these concerns, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
votedrecently to impose a12-point daily price change
limit on its Standard and Poor’s 500 stock index fu-
tures contract and to move the expiration of the con-
tract from the close to the opening of trading on
quarterly expiration days.The latter was also adopted
by the Chicago Board of Options Exchange for its
Standard and Poor’s 500 stock index option.
This paper examines the principles of trading be-
tween the spot and futures markets for stocks and the
3See, for example, Laderman, et. af. (April 7, 1986) who assert that
“Program trading, by its very nature, causes wild swings in the
markets...” p. 32; and “Program trading is a mixture of irony and
mystery. It breedsvolatility.” p. 33.“Triple witching’ is a reference to
the third Fridays of March, June, September and December. Stock
index futures contracts and options on the futures expire on these
days.
4See Laderman and Frank (September 29, 1986), p. 102. Stoller
(February 9, 1987) not only attacks programmed trading but all
speculative activity. Borrowingfrom John Kenneth Galbraith(1955),
he notes that “Wall Street, in these matters, is like a lovely and
accomplished woman whomust wear black cottonstockings, heavy
woolen underwear, and parade her knowledge as a cook because,
unhappily, her supreme accomplishment is as a harlot.” p. 24.
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claim that stock prices have become more volatile
since stock index futures were first introduced. In
addition, the paper examines whether programmed
trading has contributed to increased stock price vola-
tility.
‘The paper focuses on stock index futures rather
than options because the market for options has been
less active than the market for futures so the concerns
noted above have focused on the more active futures
market.’
‘See Belongia (1983) for a general discussion of options markets.
Kawaller (1986), p. 1 and 3, gives a general description ofoptions on
financial futures. Black and Scholes (1973) present a formal analy-
sis of optiontrading. Cinar (1987) discusses the effect ofoptions on
stock prices.
STOCK INDEX FUTURES CONTRACTS
Trading in stock index futures contracts was first
introduced by the Kansas City Board of Trade on
Febrnaiy 24, 1982. In April of the same year, the Chi-
cago Mercantile Exchange, began trading a futures
contract based on the Standard and Poor’s Index of
500 common stocks. The introduction of both con-
tracts was successful. By the end of 1982, daily trading
volume in the Standard and Poor’s futures contract,
the most successful of the two, was running at about
2D,000 contractsY
The success ofthe firsttwo contracts induced other
major exchanges to introduce similar instrnments.
°SeeSchwarz, Hill and Schneeweis(1986), pp. 87—88.
19The New York Futures Exchange, a unit of the New
York Stock Exchange, began trading a futures contract
based on the New York Stock Exchange Composite
Index in September 1983. Most recently, in July 1984,
the Chicago Board of Trade began trading a futures
contract based on the Major Market Index.
The Standard and Poor’s 500 futures contract,
which hasbeen adopted by institutional investors, has
experienced the most success. For example. the esti-
mated volume of trades in this contract was about
115,000 on April 14 of this year. The average daily
trading volume of the S&.P 500 contract has been
running at about 4 to 5 times the daily trading volume
in the contracts based on both the New York Stock
Exchange and Major Market indexes and about 15
times the contract based on the Value Line Index?
‘In addition, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange is currently trading a
futurescontract based on 100 stocks in the Standard and Poor’s 500
Index (the “Mini” S&P). Trading volume in this contract is very thin
compared with those mentioned in the text.
Characteristics ofthe Contracts
Afutures contract on a stockindex is an agreement
between a seller (short position) and buyer (longposi-
tion) to a cash settlement based on the change in the
stock index’s value between the date the futures con-
tract is entered by the two parties and some future
date.8 Table 1 summarizes some ofthe details regard-
ing each of the stock index futures contracts men-
tioned above (see the shaded insert on page 22 for a
general discussion offutures).
Table 2 presents the trading ranges for futures con-
tracts on the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index (S&.P
Futures) on February 6,1987. The delivery dates ofthe
contractstraded were thethird Fridays ofMarch, June
and September of 1987. Notice that open interest is
‘See Schwarz, Hill and Schneeweis (1986), p. 9. Stockindex futures
differ from commodity futures in that settlement of the former is
always bycash. Stock indexfutures contracts make no provision for
physicaldelivery of the stocksthat are included in theindex.
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The value of the contract at the close was $140,600
1= $500 x zsi.zo) which represented a decline in its
value of $575 from its close at $141,175 ( $500 )<
282.35) on the previous day. Traders who maintained
long positions in this contract from the close on Feb-
mary S through the close on February 6 lost $575
$500 X 1.15) per contract and this amount was de-
ducted from their margin accounts at the close of
business on the oth. The reverse was true for traders
who maintained short positions overthe time interval.
The Basis
In addition to the information about the futures
contracts, table 2 also indicates that the Standard and
Poor’s 500 Index for stocks traded on the spot market
(S&P Index) closed at 280.04 on February 6, 1987.
Notice that this amount is different than the amounts
recorded at the close for all three of the S&P Futures
contracts. The difference between the values of the
S&P Futures contracts andthe S&,P Index is called the
basis; it can be measured in dollars or index points.
For example, at the February 6 close, the basis for the
March contract was about $580 1= $500 [281.20 —
WHATDETERMINES THE BASIS?
Whenever the basis deviates substantially from its
equilibrium (or theoretical) value, profitable trading
opportunities exist and arbitrageurs will attempt to
capture them. Program trading is a method of discov-
ering and exploiting these profit opportunities. Since
the opportunities can arise when the equilibrium ba-
sis changes, it is important to understand how the
equilibrium basis is determined and what things
cause it to change.
‘The basis is “about” $580 because the New York Stock Exchange
closes at 4:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time while the International
Monetary Market closes 15 minutes later at 3:15 p.m. Central
Standard Time.
“The Value Une Index may represent an exception to this general
statement because of the averaging method used to calculate it.
See Modest and Sundaresan (1983), pp. 19—20.
greatest inthe March (nearby) contract. The market is
relatively thin for the more distant contracts. The
March contract opened at 282.50 and traded in the
range of 283.20—280.35 during the day. It closed at
281.20. Since the value of the futures contract is $500
times the index, the value of the March contract fluc-
tuated between a high of $141,600 and a low of
$140,175.
280.041) or 1.16 index points I = 281.20 — 280.04).’The
basis differs systematically across the three futures
contracts; it is larger for more distant delivery months.
The qualitative relationship between the prices ofthe
S&PIndex and the three S&P Futures contracts shown
in table 2i sgenerally the one that is observed; that is,
the value of the S&P Futures is larger than the S&P
Index, and the difference increases for more distant
contracts. A similar qualitative relationship exists be-
tween the other stock index futures contracts dis-
cussed above and their respective indexes.”
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The equilibrium difference between the S&P Index
and S&VP Futures (the equilibrium basis) is related to
the equilibrium differences between the spot and fu-
tures prices of each of the stocks in the Standard and
Poor’s Composite lnde~c”Consequently) understand-
ing thebasis for individual stocks is helpful in analyz-
ing the basis for S&P Futures contracts.
The Cost of Carry
In equilibrium, the difference between the spot
price of a stock and its expected price at some future
date is determined by the cost of holding the stock
(termed “carrying the stock forward”) from the
present to the future date. This is called “the cost of
cany.”
As mentioned above, the storage and insurance
costs of carrying stock is very low. However, a person
who purchases stock gives up the rate of return he
would have received if he invested in the next best
available alternative. Economists call this foregone
rate of return the opportunity cost of the investment;
finance analysts call it the cost of capital. Both agree
that it is equal to the market rate of interest (return)
adjusted forthe systematic risk associated with hold-
ing the particular stock.”
In order to focus on one thing at atime, suppose the
stock that is being carried forward pays no dividends
and that the cost of capital is 12.5 percent per year.”
Assume that it is now March 20, 1987 and the trader
wants a forecast of the stock’s forward price on June
19—91 days from now. Ifthe spot price of the stock on
March 20th is $50, the foregone income that could be
earned by investing the $50 at 12.5 percent for three
months is £50 )1.125i-’ — $50 = $1.49;this isthe cost of
carry. The March 20th spot price plus the cost of carry
is aforecast ofthe stock’s forwar-d price on .lune 19 (91
days from now). In this example, the forecast of the
stock’s priceon June 19th is $5149 = $50.00 + £149;.
“Thediscussion focuses on the Standard and Poor’s index not only
forconvenience but also because the Standard and Poor’s futures
contract is the most widely traded; it accounts for about 75 percent
of all trading in stock index futures. See, Wail Streef Journal (March
2,1987).
“See Brealey and Meyers (1984), p. 133. Systematic riskis given by
I~, which is a measurement of the sensitivity of the investment’s
return with respect to the market return. Roughly, (3is the percent-
age change in the present value of the investment project divided by
the percentage change in some market indexof capital values such
as the Standard and Poor’s composite index ibid., pp. I 66—67. The
costof capital, i, is calculated as I = ç3(i,,— i,) ±i,, where i,, and i, are
the market and riskfree rates of return.
“See Cornell and French (1983), Modest and Sundaresan (1983)
and Figlewski (1984) for a formal analysis of the cost of carry.
The Cost of Carry with Dividends
Computing the cost of carry is only slightly more
complicated if the stock pays dividends. Suppose that
the stock in the previous example is scheduled to pay
a dividend of s_so on April 21, 1987. The dividend
reduces the cost of carry by slightly more than $50
because the dividend paid on April 21 can be invested
between April21 and June 19. Consequently) thevalue
of the dividend as of June 19 is slightly higher than
$.50.’~ For the example considered, the cost of carry is
$50 (1.125)” — $50 (1.125)” — $50 = $98. Notice that
the dividend payment reduces both the cost of carry
(from $1.49 to $98) and the March 20th forecast ofthe
stock’s price on June 19th (from $51.49 to $50.98).
The Cost ofCarryIs Lowerfor Nearby
Delivery Dates
This discussion helps explain why the basis ob-
served in table 2i s lower for futures contracts with
nearby delivery dates. Because the holding period is
shorter, the interest earnings foregone are less for
nearby delivery dates. Similarly, as each contract ap-
proaches its delivery date, the cost of carrying the
stock shrinks for the period remalning until delivery,
other things the same; the cost of carry is zero on the
delivery date. This is shown in figure 1. Figure 1 as-
flgure 1
The Cost of Carry
C,
0
C, V Pro +~/-‘) — Ot_VO //
T
IVVt_p,
Where: C, — ‘he cost at carry at
— ‘he dehve’y date
— he coat at cepttel
P, — tee stock’s spat pace at
C, — ‘heespected dtvidend recetpt ,, days tram
“This adjustment may seem trivial. When one is computingthe basis
for a stock portfolio that runs into the millions of dollars, as is the
case forprogrammed trading, however, this adjustment can be very
important. Notice that .167 ‘e 60/360 where 60 is the number of
days between the dividend receipt on April21 and June 19.
Days
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sumes that the cost of capital (il and the dividends (Dl
the stockis expected to payare unchanged during the
holding period.
The Cost ofCarry Is Uncertain
Since expected dividends can change during the
holding period, the cost of carry is not known with
certainty. The only thing known with certainty is that
the cost of carry will be zero on the day the futures
contract is scheduled for delivery.
A change in the expected dividend will cause the
line showing the cost of carry in figure 1 to rotate
through the point labeled T. An increase in D causes
the cost ofcarry to rotate downward, while adecrease
in D causes the cost of carry to rotate upward.15
The Cost ofCarry and the Basis
The expected cost ofcarry and the basis are closely
related.” To illustrate this for a simple case, suppose
for a moment that the S&P Index contains only one
share ofstock. Suppose thatthe March 20thspot price
of the share is $50 (the level of theindex is 50) and that
‘~The cost of carry generally will vary with changes in the cost of
capital, i. Whether a direct or indirect relationship exists, however, is
problematic. Tosee this, let
(1) E(t)P(T) = F(t) =
(2) P(t)
(3) B(t) e’ F(t) — P(t).
where
E(t)P(T) = The period t expectation of the forward price
at T.
F(t) = The futures price in period t of a contract dated
fordelivery at T.
P(t) = The spot price in period t.
= The cost ofcapital.
S = The expected dividend rate.
E(t)ir = The period t expectation of the perpetual stream
of profits (~r) assumed to be of constant amount
in each period.
B(t) = The basis in period t.
Substitution gives
E(t)’n [et_etrr_tt —11 B(t)
= — E(t)’rr E(t)’u (T — t)et~_ettrtt
± IA i’
= P(t) {ehetts-t)[(T — t) — 1/i] + 1li}~ 0. Iii
“See, for example, Cornell and French (1983), pp. 2—3. The example
assumes that the equilibrium spot price is given so that the futures
price adjusts to the costof carry. In fact, spot and futures prices are
determined simultaneously.
the expected cost of carry is $1.50 per share for the
next three months (from March 20th to June 19th). If
the current price ofthe S&PFutures contract dated for
June delivery is $52.00, the $2.00 basis ( $52.00 —
$50.00) exceeds the $1.50 expected cost of carry. The
arbitrageurwill sell (go short in) June futures ata price
of $52.00per contract and buy (golong in) spot shares
of the stock at $50.00. He does this because he expects
the price of the June futures to fall to $51.50 (the spot
priceplus the expected cost ofcarry).At that price, he
can cover his futures position (by purchasing a June
futures) at acost of $51.50per contract. His gain is $50
per contract — the difference between the saleprice of
the futures contract ($52.00) and the cost of covering
the contract ($51.50).”
Thearbitrageur’s long, spot position serves to hedge
his short, futures position against unexpected
changes in the price of the stock. For example, sup-
pose both the June futures price and the spot price
riseby $3.00immediately afterthe arbitrageur sells the
futures and buys the stock spot. The June futures
price rises to $55.00 per contract and the spot price
increases to $53.00 per share. After the price change,
the basis ($2.00 = $55.00 — $53.00) still exceeds the
expected cost of carry ($1.50) by 5.50 sothearbitrageur
expects the price of the June futures to fall to $54.50
per contract.” At that price he will cover his short
position at a loss of $2.50 per contract ( $52.00 —
$54.50). This loss, however, is more than offset by his
$3.00 per share gain (= $53.00 — $50.00) on his spot
position. Hisnet gain is 5.50 (= $3.00 — $2.50) — the
same as in the previous case. By hedging in the spot
market, the arbitrageur protects the expected gain
from unexpected changes in the price of the stock.
On the other hand, suppose the price of the June
futures is $51.00. In this case, the $1.00 basis (= $51.00
— $50.00)isless than the $1.50 expected cost ofcarry.
The athitrageur will short the stock andgo long in the
June futures. The arbitrageur expects the price of the
June futures to rise to $51.50 per share. At that price,
he will sell his June futures contract at a gain of 5.50
per contract (= £51.50 — $51.00). Again,his short spot
position hedgeshis expected gain against unexpected
changes in the price ofthe stock. Since virtually any-
“Thearbitrageur alwayshas the alternative of holding the stock until
the June delivery date ofthefuturescontract atwhich time the stock
is sold and the proceeds are used to settle the futures contract.
Since the arbitrageurs’ investment in the stock is expected to be
$51.50 per share as of the settlement date (= $50.00 + $1.50),
expected profits are $50 per share.
“In fact, if the interest rate does not change, the expected cost of
carry will rise slightly because of the higher spot price.
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Figure 2
The Cost of Carry and Transaction Costs
A protitabte trading opportunity exists when:
1) The beets is greater than the cost of carry ptus transaction cost
IC ‘eSI
2) The basis is teas than the cost at carry ‘sinus rranaestios cost
IC—Kl
Where:
C V the cast at carry
1< — tranaactiOn Cost
onecan take advantage of these trading opportunities,
large deviations of the basis from the cost of carry do
not persist.
Small differences between the basis and cost of
carry may persist, however, if the transactions cost of
making the appropriate tr-ades is greater’ than the
expected gain. In terms of figure 1, transaction costs
can he represented by bands around the line repre-
senting the cost ofcarry. This is shown in figure 2.The
vertical distance hehveen the solid line and the
dashed lines r’epresent the transaction cost. If the
basis deviates from the cost of carry but remains
within the bands (as represented by point A, for exam-
plel, no profitable arbitrage trading is possible. Ifthe
basis moves outside the bands (to point B. for’ exam-
ple), arbitrageurs will exploit the profitable trading
opportunities caused by this large discrepancy. The
trading will continue until the basis has been driven
back within the hands.
TRADING STOCK INDEX FUTURES
The analysis discussed above is directly applicable
to trading among the stocks that make up the S&.P
index and the S&.P Futures contract. Rather than one
stock, however, the S&.P Index represents a basket of
500 stocks. The S&.P Index multiplied by $500 is analo-
gous to the spot price of the stock in the previous
discussion and the S&P Futures multiplied by £500
minus the S&P Index multiplied by £500 is the basis’s
In principle, the cost of carry is calculated the same
way as for an individual stock. ‘I’here are two impor-
tant practical differences, however.
First, because the S&,P index represents a well-
diversified basket ofstocks, it typically is assumed that
the risk of unanticipated changes in the value of this
basket is roughly equal to the market’s risk. Conse-
quently, the cost of capital for the S&VP Index is the
market rate ofreturn.m
A second important practical difference is that the
trader must track the dividend policies of 500 com-
panies and the dates on which the shares trade cx-
dividend in order to compute the cost of carry. These
calculations must he made quickly and accurately
because profitable trading opportunities that result
from differences between the basis and cost of carry
persist only for ashort time.
Because both the monitoring and tr’ansaction costs
increase with the number of companies included in
the ar’hitrage portfolio, traders do not track all 500
stocks inthe S&P Index. Instead, they identify asubset
of the 500 stocks whose combined value has closely
followed the value of the index in the past.” Thus
traders accept some additional rsk because the values
of their narrower portfolios are unlikely to move pre-
cisely with the S&P Index. The added risk is accepted
to reduce the expense oftracking the cost of carry for
the broader portfolio.
Of course, computer pr’ograms al-c another way to
reduce the expense of calculating and continuously
updating the cost of calry as new information be-
comes available. “Program trading” refer’s to computer
programs that compute the cost of carry and signal
profitable trading oppor’tunities. Programmed trading
is a less costly (more efficient) method of exploiting
profitable trading opportunities between the spot and
futures markets.
INDEX FUTURES AND THE
VOLATILITY OF STOCK PRICES
Various commentators have alleged that trading be-
tween the stock index futures market and the spot
“Recall that the value of an S&P Futures contract is $500 times the
index. See table 1.
‘5That is, (3 is assumed to equal 1 so that) = f3(i,. V_i,) + i, = I,,.
“See Schwarz. Hill and Schneeweis (1986), p. 91.
C+K
T Ceys
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market for stocks has increased the volatility of stock
prices. This criticism has along history.” Our analysis,
however, does not imply that stock prices will exhibit
greater volatiit as a result of this trading. Rather, it
suggests that such tr’ading r’esults in a closer corre-
spondence between prices in the spot and futures
markets. Since there is no reason to suspect, a priori,
that this trading increases thevolatility ofprices in the
spot market, we must rely on the data to help answer
this question.”
The following analysis addresses three key ques-
tions: 1) Has stock price variability increased since
stock index futures began trading eariy in 1982? 2) Are
stock prices more variable on days when futures con-
tracts are scheduled for delivery (triple witching
daysl? 3) Is stock price variability i-elated to trading
~~~~\Vityin stock index futures?
“See Working (1977), pp. 267—97.
“(bid., p. 295.
MAY 1987
The Standard and Poor’s futures contract began
trading on April 21, 1982. This is the most active
contract and accounts for about 75 per-cent of all
trading in stock index futures.”
rrahle 3 compares the period before and after’ April
1982 using weeklyand daily percentage changes in the
Standard and Poor’s 500 Index. Percentage differences
are employed to control for the general Increase in the
level of the index from 1975 through 1986.”
Panel A of table 3 examines the mean and standard
deviation of weekly and daily percentage changes in
‘~See, Wall Street Journal (March 2, 1987).
“Theindex rose from an average level of86.18 in 1975 to an average
level of236.34 in 1986. A one-pointchange in the index represented
a much larger percentage change in 1975 (about 1 .2 percent) than a
one-point change in 1986 (about .4 percent).
Percentage Changes In theS~ 500:
Pre— and Post-April 1982
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the index. As indicated, the mean ofthe weekly per-
centage change in the index prior to April 1982 was
.130 percent. After April 1982, the mean rose to .306
percent, an increase of .176 percentage points in the
later period. In the case ofthe daily data, the mean of
the daily percentage change increased by .065 per-
centage points in the later period. Neither increase is
statistically significant at conventional confidence lev-
els (t-scores are 1.30 and 1.39, respectively). The differ-
ences in the means before and after April 1982 could
easily have been produced by chance variation in the
data.
Comparing the means, however, masks much ofthe
variation in the data, because increases in the index
are offset by decreases when the mean is computed.
The standard deviation is a better indicator of varia-
tion because it measures the spread in the data
around the mean.” For example, the standard devia-
tion oftheweeklydatabefore April 1982 is 1.68. Ifthese
percentage changes in the index are normally distrib-
uted, about 67 percent ofthe weeklyobservations fall
within therange of .13 ±1.68 (or —1.56percent to 1.80
percent). The standard deviation of the weekly data
after April 1982 is 1.74 which is about the same as for
the earlier period. Infact, the two are not significantly
different in astatistical sense (the ratio ofthevariances
= 1.07). A similar conclusion holds for the daily data.
In this case, the standard deviation is somewhat
smaller in the more recent period, but is not signifi-
cantly smaller in a statistical sense.”
Panel B oftable 3 compares variation inthe index on
days when S&P 500 Futures contracts mature (settle-
ment days) to variation on all other- days (nonsettle-
ment days) for the post-April-1982 period. In the case
ofsettlement days, the data are percentage changes in
the S&P 500 Index from the close on the day before a
settlement day to theclose on the settlement day. For
nonsettlement days, the data are percentage changes
in the daily closing value of the index excluding the
changes on settlements days. As indicated in panel B,
the mean percentage change is larger on settlement
than on nonsettlement days; but the difference be-
tween thetwo is not statistically significant at conven-
tional confidence levels (t-score = .36). Similarly, the
“See Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1977), pp. 24—25.
‘in addition, both the mean absolute deviation (MAO) and mean
absolute value (MAV) of the weekly and daily percentage changes
in the index were examined for the two periods. Like the standard
deviation, these measure variation and, forthis data, each measure
tells a similarstory. As in the case of the standard deviation, both the
MAO and MAy are slightly higher for the weekly data (about 2
percent higher) and slightly lower for daily data (about 11 percent
lower) in the pest-April 1982 period.
standard deviation islarger on settlement days (.97 vs.
.88), but is not significantly larger in a statistical sense
(the ratio of the variances = 1.21). Thus, the data in
table 3 suggest that the share prices of companies
included in the S&,PIndex did not become statistically
more variable on average after the S&P Futures con-
tract began trading nor were they more variable on
settlement (triple witching) days.
Intra-Day Variation: Pit— and
Post-April 1982
The above data measures price variation from day-
to-day. Some commentators have expressed concern
about intra-day movements in stock prices. The data
in panel A of table 4 examine one measure ofthe intra-
day price spread in the S&P Index for pre- and post-
April 1982 data: the difference between the daily high
and low of the index divided by the close and multi-
plied by 10O.’~
Panel A indicates that the mean intra-day spread
was 2.03 percent before April 1982 and 1.38 percent
after. The difference, — .65 percent, is statistically sig-
nificant (t-score = 17.29) and indicates that the intra-
day percentage spread declined after April 1982.
Panel B examines whether the post-April 1982 intra-
day price spreads have been unusually large on triple
witching days.” The data indicates that the mean
intra-day percentage spread is slightly larger on triple
witching days than on nonsettlement days (1.56 vs.
1.38); the difference, however, is not statistically sig-
nificant at conventional confidence levels (using the
pooled variances, the t-score = 1.48).
To summarize, the data in table 4 indicate that there
was a statistically significant decline in the intra-day
percentage price spread in the post-April 1982 period.
There was no statistically discernible difference, how-
ever, between the spreads on triple witching days vs.
other post-April-1982 trading days.
Price Variation and Trading Activity in
S&P Futures
The data in table 5 help assess whether stock price
variability is related to trading activity in S&P Futures
contracts. The data are correlation coefficients for
daily trading volume in S&P Futures contracts (V) and
“Scaling the difference between the high and low by the daily low
rather than the close produces virtually identical results.
“See, forexample, Stoller, and Laderman and Frank (September 29,
1986), pp. 96—97.
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several measures of price variation in the S&P Index:
the daily percentage change in the S&P Index (P1, the
absolute value of the daily percentage change in the
S&P Index (Al’) and the intra-day percentage price
spread (St. Respectively, these correlations indicate
whether thevolume oftrades in S&PFutures generally
is associated with an increase or decrease in the S&~P
Index, larger orsmaller changes (either up or down) in
the S&LP Index, and larger or smaller intra-day price
spreads.
An examination of table S indicates that the coef-
ficient of correlation for V and I” is not significantly
different from zero in a statistical sense. The same
holds in the case of V and Al’. This data suggests that
neither the direction nor the magnitude of changes in
the S&P Index are associated with trading volume in
the S&,P Futures market. The coefficient of correlation
for V and S however, is negative and significantly
different from zero in astatistical sense; larger trading
volume in S&PFutures contracts generally wasassoci-
ated cvith smaller intra-day price spreads. The table 5
data are not consistent with the claim that trading
activity in S&,P Futures was associated with increased
varation in the Ski’ Index.
CONCLUSION
Numerous commentators have claimed that stock
prices have been more variable since stock index fu-
tures contracts began trading. The alleged increase in
volatility led to both closer scrntiny of the market by
the Securities and Exchange Commission and calls for
legislative action. The presumed increase in stock
price volatility has been attributed to progran,M c’d
trading — the practice of tradip’~between the spot
and futures markets for stocks. While this trading
strategy is not new, the introduction of stock index
futures contracts ar~ound1982 and the application of
computer programming techniques to trigger trades
between the markets are novel.
This paper discusses the theory that underlies pro-
grammed trading and examines various measures of
stock pricevariation. Theresults ofthe analysis arenot
consistent with the claim that tr-ading activity in the
S&,P Futures contract is associated ~th increased
price variation in the spot market for stouks.
While closer scrntiny and regulation of trading in
stock index futures markets may be justified on other
grounds, the evidence presented here suggests that
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